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I. INTRODUCTION
Without a doubt, technology and the ease of access to
information have placed heavier scrutiny on law enforcement than
ever before. Browse just about any media outlet, and one will find
headlines about defunding the police, calls for police reform, and
allegations of police misconduct. Public interest in police
effectiveness and the adequacy of police discipline has also
increased. 1 However, what has remained the same is the notion that
effective law enforcement is dependent on community trust. 2
When Sir Robert Peel formed the first modern police force
in 1829, he outlined nine principles for effective policing. Peel’s
Tyler Adams, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does
it Take to Fire a Bad Cop?, 32 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 133 (2016).
2
Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608, 609 (Cal.
1990).
1
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second principle states, “The ability of the police to perform their
duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.” 3 This
tenet remains just as relevant today in American law enforcement
as it was nearly two hundred years ago in London, England. For
modern police forces to keep the peace and effectively enforce the
law, they must have the confidence and cooperation of the
community. 4
When a police officer acts in a manner that weakens public
trust, a police agency’s efficiency is compromised. 5 Therefore, it is
imperative that allegations of officer misconduct be promptly,
thoroughly, and fairly investigated. 6 If necessary, the agency must
impose discipline. 7 The challenge for police executives, however,
is to balance the need for swift action to quell public outcry over a
critical incident with mindfulness of the enhanced job protections
afforded to police officers through due process so that disciplinary
decisions are not later overturned on appeal. 8
Due process affords police officers the opportunity to appeal
disciplinary decisions. Historically, an astounding fifty-two percent
of officers’ discipline that makes it to arbitration is reduced or
overturned, and forty-six percent of police officers that are
terminated for misconduct are awarded their jobs back as a result of
arbitration. 9 As a result, police agencies are often ordered to rehire
or reduce the discipline of officers who may have engaged in serious
misconduct. 10 On the one hand, one can argue that arbitration is
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING &
JOSEPHSON INSTITUTE OF ETHICS, BECOMING AN EXEMPLARY PEACE OFFICER:
THE GUIDE TO ETHICAL DECISION MAKING 1 (2009),
https://post.ca.gov/Portals/0/post_docs/publications/Becoming_an_Exemplary_
Peace_Officer.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LP5-KSCT].
4
NATHAN F. IANNONE ET AL., SUPERVISION OF POLICE PERSONNEL 216 (8th ed.
2014).
5
See William W. Johnston, Insurrection or Duty: When Government Employees
Speak, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 489, 497 (2000).
6
Pasadena Police Officers Assn., 797 P.2d at 609.
7
Id.
8
Lee Kraftchick, How Hard is it to Fire a Police Officer?: A Look at One Local
Government’s Experience and Some Possibilities for Reform, 50 STETSON L.
REV. 491, 492 (2021).
9
Stephen Rushin, Police Arbitration, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1059 (2021)
[hereinafter “Rushin, Police Arbitration”].
10
Id.
3
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working correctly when the decisions for the agency or the officer
are split roughly down the middle. On the other hand, a roughly
equal split still means that nearly fifty percent of officer
terminations that make it to arbitration are overturned. 11 Just
because an arbitrator makes a finding for an officer does not
necessarily mean that the officer did not engage in the misconduct.
Three common justifications for overturning an officer’s discipline
are evidentiary justifications, procedural justifications, and
proportionality justifications, 12 which will be discussed in detail
later in the article.
The ability to discipline officers is crucial for police
executives to maintain order, correct bad behavior, deter future
misconduct, 13 and effect change within an organization. Anecdotal
evidence from many jurisdictions illustrates that some conduct
found to be unacceptable by police executives, and presumably the
public at large, will result in disciplinary measures that are later
overturned through arbitration. 14 Therefore, having a disciplinary
system that is effective and able to withstand challenges is necessary
to ensure community trust in law enforcement. 15
The focus of this article is not to challenge long-standing
protectionary measures for the working conditions of police
officers, such as statutory Police Officer Bill of Rights provisions,
the function of police unions, or whether arbitration should exist in
the police disciplinary process. Rather, the article will focus on
working within and improving the existing system. This article will
provide a brief overview of police discipline and the arbitration
process, offer analysis from a recent study of published police
misconduct arbitration awards, 16 and examine the main reasons
arbitrators overturn police discipline. This article will then examine
the effects of reversing disciplinary decisions on police agencies,
provide recommendations for police executives to increase the
11

Id.
Id. at 1061.
13
See Mark Iris, Unbinding Binding Arbitration of Police Discipline: The
Public Policy Exception, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 540, 546 (2013).
14
Id. at 544.
15
Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena, 797 P.2d 608, 609 (Cal.
1990).
16
See Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1023.
12
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likelihood that police discipline is not overturned on appeal, and
finally, provide recommendations for future research.
II. POLICE DISCIPLINE AND THE ENHANCED EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
A discussion of the origin and extent of protections afforded
to law enforcement officers is necessary to understand the statistics
mentioned above. It will also help in understanding why police
officers are often granted disciplinary appeals via arbitration, rather
than simply suffering adverse employment action after evidence of
misconduct is uncovered. Unlike most private-sector employees,
most law enforcement officers are not at-will employees. 17 This
means police officers cannot be terminated or suffer adverse
employment action without “just cause” or due process. Thus, most
police officers have a right to a fair investigative process and a fair
hearing before they can be disciplined or terminated. 18
The concept that police officers are entitled to due process,
in other words, that they have a property right to their continued
employment, has developed over time and derives from several
sources, including civil service statutes, union agreements, and
court decisions. 19 Every state has enacted some form of civil service
statute governing the vast majority of public employees.20
Historically, legislatures enacted these statutes to ensure that
coveted government jobs were being awarded based on merit rather
than political patronage. 21 Although civil service statutes serve the
noble purpose of promoting fair hiring practices, some argue they
serve as impediments to investigating, disciplining, or terminating
officers who have been accused of misconduct because of the
enhanced rights the statutes afford to public employees. 22
Kraftchick, supra note 8, at 494.
See Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 784 (Cal. 1975).
19
See generally Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972).
20
JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY, § 14:5, Westlaw (database updated
Oct. 2021).
21
Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1207 (2017)
[hereinafter “Rushin, Police Union Contracts”].
22
Kraftchick, supra note 8, at 493.
17
18
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Contractual agreements further govern a police agency’s
ability to investigate and discipline officers for misconduct.23
Roughly two-thirds of American police officers are part of a labor
union that bargains collectively with employers over terms and
conditions of employment, including internal grievances and
disciplinary procedures. 24 How officers are disciplined, what kind
of appeals they are entitled to, and the privacy of disciplinary
records 25 and the destruction of those records 26 are often controlled
by collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining
agreements commonly recognize that employees may be disciplined
or discharged only when “just cause” exists, 27 which differs from
the “at-will” private sector employment standard. Proponents of
police reform suggest that civil service legislation and contractual
obligations regarding investigating police misconduct insulate
unsatisfactory employees and act as a barrier to agency reform and
accountability. 28
III. ARBITRATION AND THE PROCESS FOR SELECTING ARBITRATORS
Statutory and contractual protections provide officers facing
disciplinary action access to multiple levels of appellate review,
often culminating with arbitration. 29 Arbitration is the process by
which the employer and the officer or police union present
arguments in front of a neutral party as to why a disciplinary
decision should be stayed, reduced, or reversed. 30 The neutral
Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 21, at 1198.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, 13 (2011),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP4W-YCH7].
See also Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L. J. 839, 870 (2019).
25
Levine, supra note 24, at 870.
26
Stephen Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal Police
Reform, 51 GA. L. REV. 1209, 1218 (2017) [hereinafter “Rushin, State Labor
Law”].
27
JOHN E. SANCHEZ & ROBERT D. KLAUSNER, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT LIABILITY, § 14:6, Westlaw (database updated
Oct. 2021).
28
See Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 545,
546 (2019) [hereinafter “Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals”].
29
See Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1040.
30
See DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 1 (4th ed. 1998).
23
24
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arbitrator then renders a decision based on the evidence presented. 31
Arbitration is typically binding and the last stop in the disciplinary
review process for agencies who have incorporated arbitration into
their disciplinary schema. 32 Labor arbitration in the context of law
enforcement is a contractual process, meaning the parties have
agreed to arbitrate such disputes, usually via a clause in the
collective bargaining agreement between the law enforcement
agency and a police union. 33
A 2019 survey of 656 police departments serving large to
mid-sized communities revealed 73% of police agencies use some
form of outside arbitration in their disciplinary review process, and
68% indicated arbitrators’ decisions were binding. 34 Due to cost and
efficiency considerations, agencies typically prefer to arbitrate
employment disputes rather than litigate them through the court
system. 35
There are generally two methods agencies employ when
selecting an arbitrator. 36 Either a stipulated arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators has been agreed upon through the collective bargaining
process by both the union and the agency, or a list of several
arbitrators is provided to the parties through an arbitration service.
Parties are given alternate striking measures until one name remains
on the list, like how juries are selected in court proceedings. 37 The
benefits and potential drawbacks of the two selection methods will
be discussed later.
IV. REVIEW OF PUBLISHED POLICE MISCONDUCT ARBITRATION
AWARDS
To fully appreciate the ramifications adverse arbitration
decisions have on law enforcement agencies, it is important to
consider the types of misconduct that lead to disciplinary action. An
31

Id.
See Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 28.
33
See NOLAN & BALES, supra note 30, at 13.
34
Id. at 573.
35
See generally KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 6 (3d ed.
2014).
36
See Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 28, at 575.
37
Id.
32
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associate professor of law at Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, Stephen Rushin, examined a dataset of 624 published
arbitration awards from 2006 to 2020. 38 This is one of the most
comprehensive and recently published studies of police arbitration
decisions to date and is largely consistent with previous research. 39
The dataset was derived from a diverse range of law enforcement
agencies of varying sizes across twenty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 40 Of the 624 decisions appealed, 333
decisions involved officer terminations, 257 decisions involved
suspensions, and 34 decisions involved other disciplinary actions,
including letters of reprimand, demotions, or losses relating to job
responsibilities. 41
The types of misconduct in Professor Rushin’s study that
advanced to arbitration amounted to technical offenses (340 cases),
use of force offenses (160 cases), dishonesty offenses (144 cases),
traffic offenses (72 cases), failure to act offenses (70 cases), cases
involving substance abuse (66 cases), domestic type offenses (40
cases), sexual offenses (32 cases), and racism or homophobia
offenses (16 cases). 42
Technical offenses included various violations of
department policy that ranged from more serious instances of
conduct unbecoming of an officer and insubordination, to minor
violations such as tardiness and violations of the dress code. 43 Use
of force offenses included officers using or threatening to use
physical force, such as unauthorized chokeholds, kicking civilians
in the head, or unjustifiable or excessive use of tasers on unarmed
civilians, fellow officers, children, individuals with disabilities,
animals, and people handcuffed or in officer custody. 44 Dishonesty
offenses included falsifying police reports, lack of candor, and
withholding information. 45 Traffic, failure to act, domestic
Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9. The author of this article chose to
feature Professor Rushin’s study because of its comprehensiveness and
usefulness for highlighting possible avenues of disciplinary process reform.
39
Id. at 1044–47; see also Adams, supra note 1.
40
See Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1048.
41
Id. at 1059.
42
Id. at 1054.
43
Id. at 1056–57.
44
Id. at 1054–55.
45
Id. at 1055–56.
38
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violence, and sexual offenses are self-explanatory. Substance
offenses included cases involving alcohol, as well as other
substances. 46 Finally, racist or homophobic offenses included
officers accused of using racist or homophobic slurs, including
using the “n-word” and making offensive or inappropriate postings
on social media. 47
The data from Professor Rushin’s study, however, has some
limitations. The above statistics do not likely represent all types of
police misconduct reviewed by arbitrators over the fourteen-year
period as not all arbitration awards are published. Additionally, not
all disciplinary actions make it to arbitration, with some officers
opting not to appeal, some agencies opting to settle, and some
agencies not using arbitration as a step in the disciplinary review
process. Thus, the data may not entirely represent the prevalence of
a particular type of misconduct or the actual frequency of initial
agency disciplinary decisions being reduced or overturned. For
example, more egregious behavior may be underrepresented
because an officer may be less likely to pursue an appeal when it is
less likely they will prevail. 48
In 327, or over half of the cases, the arbitrator sided with the
police officer or police union by either reducing or overturning the
officer’s discipline. 49 On average, when an arbitrator reduced an
officer’s disciplinary decision, it was reduced by approximately
forty-nine percent. 50 Arbitrators articulated three main reasons for
overturning the aforementioned disciplinary decisions: (1)
evidentiary justifications (38%), or, in other words, the strength of
the evidence presented by the agency to justify the discipline; (2)
procedural justifications (29%), or technical flaws in the
adjudication of the case; and (3) proportionality justifications
(64%), meaning the severity of the discipline imposed was not
commiserate with the policy violation or past disciplinary
practices. 51 A discussion of common justifications for overturning
disciplinary decisions follows.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1058.
48
Id. at 1053.
49
Id. at 1059.
50
Id. at 1061.
51
Id. at 1061–62.
46
47
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A. Evidentiary Considerations & “Just Cause”
When assessing police disciplinary decisions, arbitrators are
often tasked with determining questions of fact. Arbitrators must
frequently interpret what a police agency meant when it adopted
certain policy language and how that agency would have intended
the language to be applied in the circumstance resulting in the
hearing. 52 Most collective bargaining agreements contain a
provision indicating that adverse employment action taken against
police officers requires an employer to demonstrate “just cause.” 53
However, the term “just cause” is often undefined in
collective bargaining agreements, only suggesting the employer
must have “cause” for discipline and that the cause must be just.54
Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty attempted to define the vague notion
of “just cause” in 1964 by asking the following questions, often
referred to as the Daugherty Test:
1. Did the Employer give the employee
forewarning or foreknowledge of the
possible or probable disciplinary
consequences of the employee’s
conduct?
2. Was the company’s rule or managerial
order reasonably related to (a) the
orderly, efficient, and safe operation of
the company’s business and (b) the
performance that the company might
properly expect of the employee?
3. Did the company, before administering
discipline to an employee, make an effort
to discover whether the employee did in

NOLAN & BALES, supra note 30, at 330.
Id. at 341.
54
John E. Dunsford, Arbitral Discretion: The Tests of Just Cause, in
ARBITRATION 1989: THE ARBITRATOR’S DISCRETION DURING AND AFTER THE
HEARING, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 42ND ANNUAL MEETING 25–50 (G.W.
Gruenberg, ed., 1990).
52
53
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4.
5.
6.
7.

fact violate or disobey a rule or order of
management?
Was the company’s investigation
conducted fairly and objectively?
At the investigation, did the “judge”
obtain substantial evidence or proof that
the employee was guilty as charged?
Has the company applied its rules,
orders, and penalties evenhandedly and
without discrimination to all employees?
Was
the degree
of discipline
administered by the company in a
particular case reasonably related to (a)
the seriousness of the employee’s proved
offense and (b) the record of the
employee in his service with the
company? 55

Over time, the rigid standard of the Daugherty Test fell into
disfavor because it required an affirmative answer to each question
before an arbitrator could find an employer’s disciplinary decision
to be “just.” 56 The modern standard derives from principles of
fundamental fairness that have evolved over time through
arbitration decisions. 57 The overriding consideration when
assessing “just cause” is how much “the employee’s conduct results
in, or if repeated, is likely to result in ‘[h]arm to the public
service.’” 58 Although most police officers cannot be disciplined
without “just cause,” once a public employer deems an employee’s
conduct to be disruptive to the agency, the employer is under no
constitutional or general legal obligation to retain the employee. 59
Actual harm to the agency is not required to impose discipline, so

Enterprise Wire Co. v. Enterprise Independent Union, 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. 359
(1966) (Daugherty, Arb.).
56
NOLAN & BALES, supra note 30, at 343.
57
Adams, supra note 1.
58
Skelly v. State Pers. Bd., 539 P.2d 774, 791 (Cal. 1975) (quoting
Shepherd v. State Personnel Board, 307 P2.d 4, 11 (Cal. 1957)).
59
Zaretsky v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 638 N.E.2d 986, 989
(N.Y. 1994).
55
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long as the officer has violated a departmental rule that
compromises the organization’s integrity. 60
Certain types of conduct such as physical assault, theft,
sabotage, major dishonesty, and insubordination are so universally
recognized as misconduct that some arbitrators do not require an
employer to have a formal rule against such behavior, 61 though such
rules are commonplace in police policy manuals. Other behavior,
such as attendance issues or inadequate quantity or quality of work,
requires an employer to have and publicize rules dealing with it.62
Although common sense dictates that certain behavior is
unacceptable in the workplace, without policies and rules that place
employees on notice that certain conduct is unacceptable, arbitrators
often have a difficult task when establishing that the discipline
imposed was for “just cause.” They thus are obligated to reverse the
disciplinary decision.
B. Procedural Considerations & Due Process Rights
Determining whether there was “just cause” for the
discipline or termination of a police officer not only entails
evidentiary considerations but also involves assessing whether any
of the officer’s due process procedural rights were violated by the
employer during the course of the investigation and disciplinary
proceedings. 63 Due process rights are privileges afforded to officers
during a personnel investigation and are often developed through
court decisions, legislative statutes, police policy and procedure
manuals, and collective bargaining agreements 64 which inform the
manner in which discipline can be imposed.
The United States Supreme Court has held that many public
sector employees, including police officers, have a property right in
their continued employment. 65 Public employees who have this
protected interest are entitled to due process before any adverse

Nebraska Dep’t of Corr. Servs. v. Hansen, 470 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Neb. 1991).
NOLAN & BALES, supra note 30, at 346.
62
Id.
63
See generally Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1061.
64
Id. at 1037.
65
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 632, 539 (1985).
60
61
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employment action can be taken against them. 66 Adverse
employment action includes discipline such as written reprimands,
suspension, demotion, and termination. Such action triggers certain
due process requirements, including written notice of charges, an
explanation of the evidence against them, and an opportunity to be
heard. 67 At-will employees without statutory protections do not
have the same due process protections because they do not have the
same property interest in their positions. 68
In addition to the protections provided by court decisions, a
handful of state legislatures have enacted Police Officer Bill of
Rights laws.69 Police Officer Bill of Rights laws give added due
process protections to police officers beyond those normally
provided to other civilian employees. Such laws aim to balance the
public’s interest in maintaining the efficiency and integrity of police
services with police officers’ interests in receiving fair treatment
when faced with disciplinary proceedings.
Police Officer Bill of Rights laws typically specify the
procedures for investigating police officers, the nature and
scheduling of interrogations, the right to representation during
interrogations, required self-incrimination warnings, and
confidentiality requirements related to personnel investigations70
and police discipline. 71 Some of these protections are inherently
vague and therefore ripe for challenges. For instance, the California
Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act states that
peace officers shall be afforded the right to a representative when
an interrogation is likely to result in discipline. 72 The section
stipulates, however, that it does not apply to any interrogation of a
police officer in the normal course of duty, counseling, instruction,

Carlson v. Arizona State Pers. Bd., 153 P.3d 1055 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 470 U.S. at 546.
68
Id. at 541.
69
Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of
Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 185 (2005).
70
CECIL MARR & DIANE MARCHANT, POCKET GUIDE TO THE PUBLIC SAFETY
OFFICERS PROCEDURAL BILL OF RIGHTS ACT (18th ed. 2019).
71
Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, A New Balance: Weighing Harms of Hiding Police
Misconduct Information from the Public, 22 CUNY L. REV. 148, 179 (2019).
72
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3303(i) (West 2021).
66
67
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or routine or unplanned contact by a supervisor. 73 Thus, when
supervisors discover evidence of misconduct in the course of
routine supervision and continue to question an officer about the
matter without stopping and offering the procedural protections
afforded by law, due process procedural challenges may arise.
Other procedural considerations during arbitration may
include agencies imposing discipline for misconduct that occurred
beyond the statute of limitations, agencies adhering to any required
time limits for completing an investigation and imposing discipline,
and proper notice to the officer who is being investigated. 74 While
only twenty-nine percent of the discipline that was overturned by
arbitrators in the aforementioned study listed the reason as
procedural issues, the number is significant enough to warrant
attention. 75
C. Proportionality Considerations
Based on the aforementioned study, the most common
reason arbitrators overturn disciplinary decisions is due to
proportionality considerations. 76 This usually means “discipline
that is inconsistent with the severity of the offense, like a minor
mistake that results in a serious consequence.” 77 It can also relate
to past disciplinary practices, for instance, where two officers with
similar work histories commit comparable policy violations, but one
receives harsher discipline than the other. 78
Just as police officers have discretion as to how laws are
enforced, so do supervisors when dispensing discipline. Arbitrary
or capricious discipline decisions, even those with good intentions,
pose potential issues during arbitration. Police executives must be
careful to avoid the appearance of unfairly issuing discipline in
order to prevent such awards from being overturned in arbitration.
73

Id.
Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1062.
75
Id. at 1061.
76
Id.
77
Richard R. Johnson & Matt Dolan, Making Discipline Stick Beyond
Arbitrator Review, LAW ENF’T BULL., (Dec. 19, 2019),
https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/featured-articles/making-discipline-stick-beyondarbitrator-review [https://perma.cc/NG2Z-4XT9].
78
Id.
74

77

Sometimes a finding of excessiveness of discipline in
arbitration seems to rely on the arbitrator’s judgment. 79 Reasons
often cited by employers for the need to discipline employee
misconduct include rehabilitation and deterrence. 80 Thus, it follows
that the penalty imposed for bad behavior should be congruous with
the set objectives, in other words, not too harsh but also not too
lenient so that an employee is able to learn from the punishment and
is deterred from future similar misconduct. Some offenses are
universally recognized as serious enough to warrant discipline and
even termination on the first offense. 81 Other less serious offenses
will likely require progressive discipline for each successive offense
for an arbitrator to sustain more serious discipline. Thus, if a history
of misdeeds is not properly documented, an arbitrator may be forced
to reduce or overturn a disciplinary award. The recommendations
offered later in this article provide suggestions to police executives
about how to avoid common proportionality pitfalls.
V. THE EFFECTS OF OVERTURNING POLICE DISCIPLINE AND
WHETHER POLICE DISCIPLINE STANDARDS SHOULD BE
CHANGED
The fact that roughly half of police discipline decisions that
make it to arbitration are reduced or overturned has important
implications for law enforcement accountability and reform.
Although the number of discipline awards that arbitrators
overturn—fifty-two percent 82—seems high, not all disciplinary
decisions are appealed, and some cases are settled before they reach
arbitration. Thus, the statistic for police disciplinary decisions
“sticking” is likely higher than the figures reveal. Also, as
mentioned previously, it may be that the disciplinary decisions that
reach arbitration are the most questionable.
Whether these statistics are viewed favorably depends on
which side one represents. 83 Those acting on the side of police
officers and unions likely view the arbitration system as working
Adams, supra note 1, at 148.
See NOLAN & BALES, supra note 30, at 345.
81
Id. at 346.
82
Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1023.
83
Id. at 1031.
79
80

78

correctly and as an appropriate system of checks and balances. This
belief is supported by the fact that nearly half of the cases find for
the officer, and half of the cases find for the agency. 84 On the other
hand, if someone is advocating on the side of the agency, then they
may argue that overturning discipline frustrates management’s
ability to effectively lead an agency. 85
At first glance, the nearly equal distribution of arbitration
awards seems appropriate, given arbitrators are tasked with fairness
and impartiality; however, there is something amiss about this
notion. 86 The process leading to the disciplinary action of an officer
is an intensive one. 87 It may include supervisor review, executive
review, and third-party review, in addition to a subsequent
disciplinary hearing. 88 Therefore, it seems odd that the single
decision of an arbitrator would outweigh the collective decisions of
people who have extensive knowledge of what they estimate is best
for the agency and community at large. 89
There is a consensus among police chiefs that overturned
disciplinary decisions leave a feeling of “not having control over
one’s agency and that one’s judgment is somewhat insignificant.”90
Invariably, discipline that does not “stick” reflects poorly on the
agency, 91 especially when the agency is forced to reinstate a
dismissed officer. The result may be an embittered marginal
performing officer, who does just enough to avoid further
discipline, all the while disrupting the morale of their coworkers. 92
This makes managing a police agency efficiently and enacting
meaningful reform within the agency a slow, difficult process, even
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without considering the potential for external community
ramifications.
When officers are not held to task for violations of policy,
the looming threat of adverse employment action is minimized. In
the same vein, arguably, the officers that were allowed to repeat
their bad behavior with limited consequence did not learn from their
mistakes. For instance, officers that have repetitive bad behavior
potentially learn how to be better at avoiding disciplinary sanctions
rather than becoming better officers because of their familiarity with
the disciplinary process.
Having to reinstate previously terminated officers also has
financial drawbacks for agencies. 93 Reversal of a termination will
typically carry with it reinstatement to duty with back pay and
benefits retroactive to the date of termination. 94 Collateral costs may
have been incurred by the agency as well for paying overtime to
cover the absence of the disciplined officer.
Despite the drawbacks of the enhanced protections afforded
to officers, which some argue frustrate the process of imposing
discipline, the laws and statutes serve other important functions, as
discussed earlier. Rather than focusing on alternatives to
arbitration—a system that has been in place in some jurisdictions
for well over fifty years—this article advocates agencies first
attempt to work within the system to provide a quicker solution to a
difficult problem. The following section offers recommendations
for police executives to reduce the likelihood of police discipline
being overturned through arbitration.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE EXECUTIVES TO REDUCE THE
LIKELIHOOD THAT POLICE DISCIPLINE IS OVERTURNED
THROUGH ARBITRATION
In the wake of several high-profile police incidents, police
executives face the difficult task of balancing the need for swift
public action with ensuring involved officers’ due process rights are
observed when a critical incident occurs. Despite the seemingly
irreconcilable dichotomy between the two objectives, there are
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several steps police executives can take preemptively to lessen the
likelihood that discipline for police misconduct will be overturned
through arbitration.
A. Addressing the Root Causes of Misconduct
The aim of police supervisors and executives foremost
should be to identify officers engaged in problematic behavior
before the behavior results in discipline. 95 Although not related to
reducing the number of disciplinary decisions specifically
overturned in arbitration, a mention of reducing the root causes of
misconduct may impact the overall number of disciplinary decisions
in general and thus disciplinary decisions that are available for an
appeal to arbitration. An examination of the organizational culture
and operational style of an agency, as well as an agency’s hiring and
training practices, may bear weight on the number of disciplinary
instances that agency executives encounter.
1. Organizational Culture and Operational Style of an Agency
One of the most obvious places to start for a richer
understanding of police misconduct is the organization’s culture.
The culture of an agency “includes the formal and informal norms
and expectations that create the environment” in which the
misconduct is allowed to continue. 96 For instance, the Christopher
Commission, which was created in order to investigate the Los
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the wake of the Rodney
King incident, was tasked with assessing LAPD’s overall style of
policing. 97 The Commission discovered that the LAPD’s policing
style emphasized crime control over crime prevention and was
extremely proactive. 98 It rewarded more aggressive tactics and
enforcement and evaluated officers largely on quantitative
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statistical measures rather than on qualitative work-product. 99 The
Commission concluded that the overall policing style resulted in
increased violent police-civilian confrontations. 100 Although
contentious encounters with citizens are not inherently indicative of
police misconduct, these encounters have the propensity to increase
the number of citizen complaints and thus investigations into officer
conduct, which may directly or collaterally uncover misconduct.
Therefore, changing the organizational culture and methods an
agency employs may directly impact officer disciplinary incidents
and later appeals to arbitration.
Another task the Christopher Commission was given was
assessing the failure of LAPD’s management to control a relatively
small number of officers engaged in repeated misconduct,
specifically excessive use of force. 101 The Commission discovered
that “of approximately 1,800 officers against whom an allegation of
excessive force or improper tactics was made . . . over 1,400 had
only one or two allegations. But, 183 had four or more allegations,
44 had six or more, 16 had eight or more, and one had 16
allegations.” 102 Despite having access to personnel complaint
information, supervisors generally commented positively about the
officers’ performance with repeated instances of misconduct on
those officers’ performance evaluations. 103 This resulted in the
continued promotion of officers who had committed misconduct.104
To counter similar situations where agencies find they have officers
who have repeated instances of bad behavior, agency supervisors
should consider monitoring for officers engaging in problematic
behavior and take part in coaching and providing additional training
to curb repeated instances of misconduct. 105
Agency supervisors and executives should consider
fostering a culture supporting adherence to policy and
documentation of performance, whether that performance is
positive or negative, to reduce instances of officer misconduct.
99
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Failing to adequately document poor performance on performance
evaluations may limit an arbitrator’s ability to justify progressive
disciplinary action.
Collective bargaining agreements frequently limit the ability
of police agencies to keep records on officer discipline. 106 Nearly
half of police union contracts mandate the destruction of
disciplinary records over time. 107 Adequately documenting
performance on an officer’s performance evaluation apart from their
disciplinary record may help ensure that some memorialization of
unacceptable behavior exists after other disciplinary records have
been destroyed. 108 By holding officers accountable and not
accepting those who depart from policy, police executives can
potentially reduce the root cause of misconduct within an agency
and thus lessen the number of disciplinary appeals that arise.
2. Hiring and Training Standards
“If you don’t like the current crop of law enforcement
officers, wait until you see the second string when recruiting
standards drop in order to fill positions.”109 Agencies across the
nation have seen a drop in qualified applicants. 110 Staffing shortages
may lead an agency to consider lowering hiring standards. 111
Logically, however, the expectations of hiring standards and quality
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of officer training are correlated with how well police officers
respond in given situations.
Police training serves three broad purposes: to prepare
officers to act appropriately in the wide array of situations they are
faced with when carrying out their duties; to enhance productivity
and effectiveness; and to foster cooperation and unity of purpose
within an agency. 112 Simply stated, officers who have been poorly
screened during the hiring process and officers who are
inadequately trained likely have higher instances of police
misconduct.
Agencies should use caution when attempting to counter
staffing shortages and reductions in their budget by lowering hiring
standards and reducing officer training. Perhaps a solution is to
adjust recruiting tools to attract more qualified candidates and create
innovative low or no cost training opportunities to respond to
reduced or “defunded” training budgets. Doing so has the potential
to lessen the prevalence of officer misconduct within an agency and,
therefore likely reduce the number of disciplinary decisions that
make it to arbitration.
B. Department Policy Considerations
Police agencies should absolutely ensure that they have a
robust and current policy. If an agency has a comprehensive policy
manual that details the expectations placed upon officers, then
establishing “just cause” becomes less difficult for arbitrators. It is
also necessary for police executives to frequently review their
policies and procedures to ensure that they are current with recent
legislative enactments, statutory changes, and court decisions.
Oftentimes, it is difficult for agencies to monitor recent legal
developments and implement them into policy on a continuous
basis. There are many companies that provide standardized police
policy manuals that are kept up to date with legal changes and can
be minimally modified to fit the unique requirements of individual
agencies.
It is important that police executives consider not making
hasty conclusions about critical incidents in the wake of public
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demand without a careful review of the incident in light of agency
policy. Arbitrators will be forced to overturn disciplinary decisions
if the decision is not supported by sufficient evidence of a policy
violation despite any negative sentiment the public may have about
the incident.
C. Narrowing the Scope of Review
Collective bargaining agreements often specify whether or
not arbitration will be used in disciplinary appeals. 113 Barring any
statutory prohibitions, if agencies do not like the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, they can likely bargain to change
the terms of the agreement. It may be possible for an agency to
bargain that the arbitrators use a specified evidentiary standard or
mirror the scope of review in arbitration hearings to the standard of
review found in appellate hearings in civil litigation.
In a civil appeal, the standard of review varies depending on
the reason for the appeal. 114 The broadest and most beneficial
standard for the party seeking the appeal is de novo, meaning the
judge can review the entire case anew without any deference to how
the previous court decided the issue. 115 The judge is only permitted
to review a case de novo when there are questions of law or mixed
questions of fact and law. 116 For civil appeals involving abuse of
judicial discretion claims, the appellate judge is required to give
greater deference to the trial court’s decision. 117 Put another way,
the abuse of discretion must be an “eye-popping, neck-snapping,
jaw-dropping egregious error” 118 for the court to find for the
appellant in an abuse of discretion claim. Lastly, an appellate court
will use the clearly erroneous standard of review to reconsider
findings of fact when there is a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake of fact has been committed. 119
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Standards of review relate to arbitration because, currently,
most police arbitrators review disciplinary appeals de novo. 120 In
essence, this provides the officer appealing a disciplinary decision
the opportunity to have the arbitrator review it with a fresh set of
eyes, regardless of the reason for the appeal. For example, even if
neither party is disputing whether the officer engaged in
misconduct, the arbitrator may still reconsider the facts supporting
a charge without deference to an agency’s finding of misconduct.
This seems to run contrary to civil litigation practices and provides
the officer with yet another chance at having discipline reduced,
even after having their proposed discipline reviewed in a predisciplinary hearing by the agency and sometimes even by a
community civilian review board.
When nearly sixty-four percent of disciplinary appeals are
based on proportionality claims, 121 changing the standard of review
to mirror civil litigation may have significant results. For example,
if an agency has a discipline matrix, and the contested discipline
falls within the set matrix, using a standard of review commensurate
with civil litigation would require the arbitrator to give deference to
the agency’s disciplinary decision. The result may be a reduction in
disciplinary awards being overturned because of the reduced
likelihood of a finding for the accused officer.
D. Selecting Burden of Proof Requirements
In addition to changing the standard of review required
when appealing arbitration decisions, agencies should consider
what standard for burden of proof the arbitrator will use to render
their decision. 122 Common standards for burden of proof are the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard and the slightly more
rigid “clear and convincing” standard. With the preponderance of
the evidence standard, the factfinder only needs to be convinced by
the greater weight of the evidence that the officer engaged in the
misconduct. By contrast, a clear and convincing standard requires
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that it was highly probable or probably certain that the officer
engaged in the misconduct. Having agency investigators mirror
their standard for burden of proof to the standard that will be used
by the arbitrator if the discipline is appealed may make a difference
in the outcome of a future arbitration decision.
For example, if an agency conducted its investigation into
an officer’s alleged misconduct and an investigator sustained an
allegation based on a preponderance of the evidence standard, that
disciplinary decision may not be upheld by an arbitrator if the
arbitrator is viewing the case based on the more stringent clear and
convincing standard. In such a case, the arbitrator may have to
overturn the decision. Thus, it is imperative the agency and the
arbitrator base their decisions on the same standard for burden of
proof.
E. Training for Line Supervisors
Police agencies should ensure supervisors receive adequate
training and have a thorough understanding of the importance of
observing officers’ due process rights. Due process rights may not
get as much fanfare on training agendas as other matters of police
procedure because they come into play far less than laws of arrest
and tactical considerations. Many employers may even shy away
from focusing on employee rights, given the impression that it may
empower employees to exercise those rights in a litigious manner.
However, it is imperative for agencies to ensure their supervisors at
the very least understand the gray areas of police due process and
procedural rights, given that procedural considerations are
commonly cited by arbitrators as reasons for overturning
discipline. 123
F. Considerations for Selecting Arbitrators
As mentioned previously, it may seem as though the
arbitration system is working correctly if the impartial arbitrator is
finding for the agency roughly half of the time and finding for the
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officer the other half of the time. 124 This may, however, be a product
of how arbitrators are selected. As mentioned above, there are two
common methods of selecting arbitrators, either the alternate strike
method from a pool of arbitrators or a specifically named arbitrator
in a collective bargaining agreement. 125 Either method may raise
questions of partiality.
The saying, “Don’t bite the hand that feeds you,” comes to
mind. When an arbitrator consistently makes findings against the
party that selected them to hear a case, the chances of that same
arbitrator being selected again by the same party may be lessened if
the party feels that the arbitrator tends to make a finding more often
for the opposing party. There may be a tendency for the arbitrator
to receive a strike the next time the alternate strike method is used.
Similarly, the parties could negotiate a new arbitrator into a
collective bargaining agreement during the next negotiation period
rather than the arbitrator that was previously selected. This is not to
say that arbitrators are intentionally biased toward one side or the
other, but that they may unintentionally employ compromise more
than necessary out of a natural inclination toward self-interest and
job preservation.
The methods by which arbitrators are selected could be
altered to counter this bias. For example, in 2020, Minnesota passed
the Minnesota Police Accountability Act to do away with the
alternate strike method in police arbitration. 126 Instead, arbitrators
are appointed from a rotating panel selected by the state in an
attempt to prevent agencies from “gaming the process.” 127 The
future impact of Minnesota’s newly enacted statute presents an
opportunity ripe for research on how the selection of arbitrators will
affect arbitration decisions, specifically in areas where arbitrators
have more subjective input into their decisions.
G. Creating a Discipline Matrix or Guidelines

Id. at 1023.
See Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, supra note 28, at 575.
126
See generally Adrienne Baker, Police Accountability: How Narrowing the
Scope of Arbitration and Limiting Procedural Protections Can Promote Social
Trust and Justice, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. J. PUB. POL & PRAC. 117 (2021).
127
Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1034.
124
125

88

Police officers understand fairness. They are tasked as being
guardians of due process and discretion when enforcing the law
toward the public. 128 It is only natural that officers feel slighted
when they perceive their own agency has violated a duty of fairness
that is required of officers. Although it is tempting to use
discretionary forgiveness for seemingly insignificant violations of
policy for some employees and not for others, “good deeds”
regarding disciplinary matters tend to cause issues for the agency in
subsequent disciplinary matters. Therefore, it is imperative that
police executives keep a close eye on the range of discipline
imposed for each violation to ensure that disciplinary decisions do
not have the appearance of being arbitrary or capricious.
Since sixty-four percent of disciplinary appeals are based on
proportionality claims, 129 in other words, fairness claims, it makes
sense to look at solutions to mitigate this figure. One such solution
is for agencies to employ a discipline matrix or guidelines.130
Discipline matrices are modeled after criminal court sentencing
guidelines. 131 An agency establishes parameters within which it can
dispense discipline for particular misconduct, considering any
aggravating and mitigating factors. 132 Doing so will reduce the
amount of discretion afforded to agency executives in dispensing
discipline and, in theory, will also reduce the perception of
unfairness among employees because all employee misconduct is
treated equally within a limited range of possible disciplinary
action. As mentioned above, if the discipline for certain behavior
falls within the matrix, the arbitrator will likely have a harder time
justifying a punishment that does not comport with proportional
standards.
H. Reset Memorandums
In a similar vein, if an agency discovers past inconsistencies
with how discipline was handled, the agency can issue a “reset”
memorandum that places employees on notice that new disciplinary
LoRusso, supra note 109.
Rushin, Police Arbitration, supra note 9, at 1061.
130
Johnson & Dolan, supra note 77.
131
Id.
132
Id.
128
129

89

consequences will result for future violations rather than the
consequences that were issued in the past.133 According to law
enforcement consultants Johnson and Dolan, “As long as the memo
is reasonable, clear, distributed to all employees, and followed in
practice, deviating from past disciplinary procedures can prove
defensible in court and in arbitration.” 134 Doing so may have the
effect of reducing proportionality or fairness claims.
I. Last Chance Agreements
Arbitrators are far more likely to sustain an employer’s
discharge action when the grievant was on a last chance
agreement. 135 In a study conducted by Mario Bognanno, Jonathan
Booth, Thomas Norman, Laura Cooper, and Stephen Befort,
arbitrators were 22.3% more likely to find for the employer if the
employee was on a last chance agreement. 136 Common knowledge
indicates this statistic makes sense because it reduces the discretion
of the arbitrator when an employer presents an enforceable last
chance agreement, there is proof to the requisite evidentiary
standard that the offense occurred, and there are no circumstances
that would absolve the employee of their offense. 137
J. Considerations for Agency Representation
Since an arbitrator can only rule on the facts presented to
them in an arbitration case, it is up to the parties on both sides to do
due diligence in presenting their case. Police officers are generally
represented by attorneys who specialize in police defense, while
police agencies are typically represented by a city or county attorney
that handles a wide variety of issues that confront local
133
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governments. Thus, city or county attorneys may not be as familiar
with police discipline and the intricacies of police due process as an
attorney who solely specializes in the niche market of police
defense. The knowledge and experience of the attorneys for each
party may be evident in the arguments made and how the facts of a
case are presented. Any disparities may have a bearing on an
arbitrator’s decision, given that an arbitrator can only rule on the
evidence presented. An agency should consider employing special
counsel who focuses on police matters beyond that of its general
city or county attorney, when defending more serious police
misconduct cases to ensure the agency is adequately represented
against an opposing counsel who may only handle the intricacies of
police cases.
K. Vacating Arbitration Decisions on Public Policy Grounds
As a last resort, if an arbitrator overturns a disciplinary
decision through arbitration, a police agency can petition a court to
vacate the arbitrator’s decision on the grounds that the decision
violates public policy. 138 Doing so is often governed by
jurisdictional rules, regulations, and constitutional provisions.139
Just because an arbitrator’s award may be unjust, inadequate,
excessive, or contrary to the law does not mean that a court will
vacate it. 140
Vacating an arbitration award on public policy grounds is
limited to situations where the award would violate some explicit
public policy that is “well defined, dominant, and ascertainable by
reference to laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interest.” 141 As such, courts focus
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on whether the award itself violates public policy rather than the
employee’s conduct. 142
In a review of arbitration awards by Tracy Farrell where an
agency sought reversal based on public policy, courts have vacated
awards reinstating officers who were terminated for sexual
harassment, racial harassment, revealing the identity of a
confidential informant, and shoplifting while in uniform. 143 The
same study found that courts refused to vacate arbitration awards
reinstating officers who were terminated for unfitness for duty,
using excessive force, purchasing and using marijuana, having
excessive levels of alcohol and cocaine while not on duty,
committing domestic assault, sexual harassment, racial harassment,
sexual misconduct and lying to superiors, having consensual sex
with a witness or informant, and violating other regulations.144
In general, and not specific to police cases, courts were more
likely to vacate arbitration awards reinstating employees when
repeated past violations were indicative of the likelihood of future
violations. 145 Such a figure makes it even more pressing for
agencies to document employee conduct thoroughly. Additionally,
also generally and not specific to police cases, courts were more
likely to vacate an arbitration award for reinstatement if the
arbitrator touched upon the substantive questions of the case rather
than just on procedural grounds. 146 Again, such a figure makes it
imperative that police executives ensure disciplinary decisions are
made on a sound evidentiary basis.
L. Identifying Agency Specific Patterns in Arbitration Decisions
Rather than overhaul an agency’s disciplinary process,
another option for agencies is to look at their agency’s specific
statistics for decisions that are being overturned in an attempt to
identify a pattern that would be in line with a suggestion previously
outlined in this article. For example, if an agency’s disciplinary
decisions are regularly overturned for evidentiary issues, it may be
142
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worth looking at the agency’s processes for sustaining a finding of
misconduct. If the majority of an agency’s decisions that are being
overturned or reduced are due to proportionality justifications,
perhaps the agency should look to developing a discipline matrix.
Making small changes to an agency’s disciplinary process may
yield changes that are readily observable and measurable as
opposed to throwing darts at a problem in an attempt to see what
works.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Police discipline and police reform are hot topics favored in
the media. Although collective bargaining agreements, civil
services statutes, and legislative policies may be a detriment to
being able to discipline police officers effectively, each has a
constructive function. Rather than attempting to change existing
laws, there are other less arduous methods police agencies can
employ to increase the likelihood that police discipline is not
overturned in the arbitration process. Such methods, among others,
focus on policy and procedure manuals, training for supervisors on
due process rights, and focusing on the discretionary aspect of
disciplining officers.
Because arbitration awards are not always published, it is
difficult to get a clear understanding of disciplinary decisions.
Future research on police arbitration could examine how many
cases are settled prior to arbitration, as this may skew the nearly
fifty-fifty split findings between agencies and officers. Another
avenue for research is testing the impact of employing the potential
solutions for police executives mentioned above, individually or in
combination, to determine their specific impact on arbitration.
Lastly, examining how agencies investigated cases that were
ultimately overturned for “just cause” may yield insightful best
practices for misconduct investigations to ensure that similar cases
are not overturned in the future.
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